“Might Not Be a Tomorrow”: A Multi-Methods Approach to Anticipated Early Death and Youth Crime

Timothy Brezina
Georgia State University

Erdal Tekin
Georgia State University

Volkan Topalli
Georgia State University

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Timothy Brezina
Erdal Tekin
Volkan Topalli

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ABSTRACT

A number of researchers point to the anticipation of early death, or a sense of "futurelessness," as a contributing factor to youth crime and violence. Young people who perceive a high probability of early death, it is argued, may have little reason to delay gratification for the promise of future benefits, as the future itself is discounted. Consequently, these young people tend to pursue high-risk behaviors associated with immediate rewards, including crime and violence. Although existing studies lend empirical support to these arguments and show a statistical relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime, this support remains tentative. Moreover, a number of questions remain regarding the interpretation of this relationship, the meanings that offenders attach to the prospect of early death, and the causal mechanisms that link anticipated early death to youth crime. In this paper, we address the limitations of previous studies using a multi-methods approach, involving the analysis of national survey data and in-depth interviews with active street offenders.
“MIGHT NOT BE A TOMORROW”: A MULTI-METHODS APPROACH TO ANTICIPATED EARLY DEATH AND YOUTH CRIME

Prior criminological research has served to highlight the risks of offending behavior. These risks include a number of long-term negative consequences that may accrue to offenders over the life course, including reduced life chances, poor health, and incarceration (Hagan, 1991, 1997; Moffitt, 1993; Robins, 1966; Sampson and Laub 1993, 1997; Tanner, Davies, and O’Grady, 1999). These risks also include immediate physical dangers—such as injury, paralysis, or death—that exist in the “foreground” of the criminal lifestyle and that may result from crime victim retaliation, attacks by rival offenders, or police action (Dobrin, 2001; Hoffman, 2004; Jacobs, Topalli, and Wright, 2000; McCarthy and Hagan, 2005; Sampson and Lauritsen, 2005; Topalli, Wright, and Fornango, 2002; Tremblay and Paré, 2003).

At the same time, criminological research has highlighted the existence of hard-core offenders who appear to be fearless in the face of these dangers (Anderson, 1994, 1999; Hoffman, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2000; McCarthy and Hagan, 2005; Topalli, 2005a). This population includes individuals who have experienced stabbings, shootings, or other life-threatening injuries and yet remain undeterred from a risky and criminal lifestyle (Hoffman, 2004). In the words of one such offender, “I don’t give a damn. I don’t care what happens really… whether they kill us or we kill them” (Topalli and Wright, 2004: 164).

To account for the fearless and uninhibited conduct of some offenders, a number of theorists have underscored the sense of hopelessness and fatalism that is said to pervade economically distressed, high-crime communities (Anderson, 1994, 1999; Garbarino et al., 1992; Kitwana, 2002; Lorion and Saltzman, 1993; Wilson and Daly, 1997). When young people believe they have no future, it is argued, they have little to lose by engaging in crime or violence. This argument is perhaps most explicit in rational choice accounts. For example, Wilson and
Daly (1997) propose that urban youth violence is partly attributable to expectations of early death, which tend to arise in neighborhoods that suffer a high mortality rate. “If a young man's grandfathers were both dead before he was born, for example, and some of his primary school classmates had already died,” the tendency to discount the future, and to pursue risky activities that produce immediate rewards, “could be a normal, adaptive reaction” (Wilson and Daly, 1997: 1274; also see Gardner, 1993; Hill, Ross, and Low, 1997).

This argument is also expressed in subcultural accounts of youth violence, most notably in the ethnographic works of Elijah Anderson (1994, 1999). To account for the high rates of youth violence he observed in various inner-city neighborhoods, he highlights the need expressed by many disadvantaged young males to maintain respect in public encounters and the willingness of some to risk injury or even death “over the principle of respect” (Anderson, 1994: 92). This fearless attitude toward violence is said to be rooted in the perceived possibility of early death: “Many are uncertain about how long they are going to live and believe they could die violently at any time. They accept this fate; they live on the edge” (Anderson, 1994: 94).

Although systematic data in this area are limited, a handful of quantitative studies have examined the relationship between future life uncertainty (e.g., perceived likelihood of dying before age 25) and youth crime. In general, these studies provide tentative empirical support for the idea that anticipated early death is associated with youth crime and violence (Caldwell, Wiebe, and Cleveland, 2006; DuRant et al., 1994; also see Agnew 2002; Wilson and Daly, 1997). Yet, as described below, questions remain regarding the nature of this association and whether the anticipation of early death is indeed a contributing factor to offending behavior. Moreover, the nature of this relationship may be more complex than suggested by previous studies.
In this study, we seek to advance research on the relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime. To enrich our understanding of this relationship, we adopted a multi-method strategy, combining complementary quantitative and qualitative studies. Multi-method approaches allow researchers to combine the scientific objectivity afforded by quantitative techniques with a rich understanding of context that can only be derived through qualitative interviews with offenders. In Study 1, we seek to overcome the limitations of previous quantitative studies by utilizing longitudinal data from a large and nationally representative survey of adolescents. In Study 2, we draw on data from an ongoing ethnographic study of active street offenders to inform our interpretation of the quantitative findings and to deepen our understanding of offenders’ attitudes towards death and the risks of criminal activity.

We believe that a closer examination of this issue, employing the strategy described above, is important for several reasons. First, the findings of our quantitative and qualitative analyses may help to advance our understanding of the causes of youth crime and violence and may have implications for the credibility of existing theoretical accounts (e.g., Anderson, 1994, 1999; Hill et al., 1997; Wilson and Daly, 1997). Second, it is necessary to address the limitations of prior research, and to substantiate the previously observed relationship between anticipated early death and crime, in order to move beyond basic questions in this area—a task for which multi-method procedures are particularly well-suited. As described below, a multi-methods approach can help to expose the causal mechanisms that may be responsible for this relationship and may point to new directions for future criminological research. Third, our findings may have implications for the control of youth crime and violence. For example, efforts to deter criminal offenders by increasing the future costs of crime may have little impact if, in fact, offenders tend to discount the future (Anderson, 1994; Hill et al., 1997).
ANTICIPATED EARLY DEATH AND YOUTH CRIME: EXISTING THEORY AND RESEARCH

Participation in risky behaviors such as crime or violence often leads to undesirable outcomes with potentially deadly consequences (Hill et al., 1997). As emphasized by Ross and Hill (2002: 461), risk-taking is defined as “behavior that jeopardizes well-being or survival” (emphases in original). From a rational-choice perspective, it follows that expectations about future well-being or survival—such as the anticipation of early death—would influence a decision to engage in risk-taking (Caldwell et al., 2006; Gardner, 1993; Hill et al., 1997; Wilson and Daly, 1997). Drawing on concepts from life history theory, and informed by a Darwinian/adaptationist framework, Hill and her colleagues (1997) propose an analytical model of risk-taking that incorporates an emphasis on future unpredictability and “lifespan estimates.” Specifically, they predict a lower willingness to engage in risky behavior among individuals who believe that life is predictable and who are able to foresee a future. Such persons tend to be forward-looking and orient themselves, in part, to the future costs and benefits of their actions.

In contrast, individuals who view the future as uncertain or unpredictable, and who lack confidence in their future survival, are expected to be focused on the “here and now.” Because they view the future itself as uncertain, the future consequences of behavior are discounted, while the immediate benefits of behavior become salient. This orientation should be associated with an increased willingness to engage in risky behaviors, including aggression (Hill et al., 1997; also see Wilson and Daly, 1997). In short, “delaying present gratification for future rewards makes no sense without a long, stable future to look forward to” (Caldwell et al., 2006:600). The grey shaded boxes in the center of figure 1 depict the hypothesized causal chain outlined by Hill and her associates, specifically as it would apply to the relationship between
anticipated early death and youth crime.

This rational choice approach fits well with prior research indicating that hardcore street offenders maintain a strong commitment to hedonistic, self-perpetuating boom-and-bust “partying” cycles focused on drug use, sex, materialistic pursuits, and indiscriminate lawlessness. Such offenders spend as much as they have, as quickly as possible. The constant need for cash, drugs, and alcohol to “keep the party going”—combined with careless spending habits—leads offenders to participate in serious crime to bankroll their impulsive lifestyles (Katz, 1988; Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs et al., 2003, 2000; Shover, 1996; Shover and Honaker, 1992; Topalli et al., 2002; Wright and Decker, 1997, 1994).

Moreover, future uncertainty—including the anticipation of early death—emerges as an explicit theme in several ethnographic studies of criminal offenders. In addition to the works of Elijah Anderson, described earlier, these studies include Topalli and Wright’s (2004) study of active carjackers in St. Louis, Missouri and Hoffman’s (2004) study of inner-city offenders in Boston and Los Angeles. Topalli and Wright (2004: 162) observe that many of the offenders in their study display an “almost complete disregard” for the future consequences of their risky criminal pursuits. Although the authors did not focus on life expectancy per se, the responses of their interviewees suggest that this disregard for future consequences may be related to future uncertainty. For example, when asked how he spends the money he makes from carjacking, one offender responded with the following:

*Just get high, get high. I just blow the money... So everyday, there's not a promise that there'll be another [day] so I just spend it, you know what I'm saying?* (Topalli and Wright, 2004: 162).

Hoffman (2004) observes that, among the offenders she interviewed, the prospect of an early death was accepted as part of day-to-day life in the inner-city. According to Hoffman, the young people in her study “accepted the likelihood of [early] death as normal or expected”—an
expectation that fostered feelings of powerlessness, worthlessness, and the belief that there is “little else to lose” (2004: 62-75). Moreover, this expectation of an early demise, or of limited life chances, was reinforced by the views of other people in their lives. In the words of one young offender:

_Everybody said, “You ain’t never going to make it, you are going to end up dead or you are going to be in prison and you’re going to catch 25-to-life, you’re going to do this”_ (Hoffman, 2004: 112).

While highly suggestive, these qualitative studies were not specifically designed to examine the relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime. The findings are, however, consistent with the results of quantitative research in this area. Although we are not aware of any quantitative studies that focus primarily on the anticipation of early death, relevant findings have been reported in the quantitative research literature and such findings increase confidence in the qualitative work described above.

For example, DuRant and his colleagues (1995) explored the correlates of violent behavior in a sample of adolescents living in or around public housing projects in Augusta, Georgia. In this sample, self-reported violent behavior was moderately and negatively correlated (-0.18) with a self-rating of survival probability. In particular, the belief that one would reach 25 years of age was associated with a lower level of violent behavior (conversely, the belief that “I won’t live to be 25” was associated with a higher level of violence).

In a study of risk-taking by Hill, Ross, and Low (1997), community college students and their acquaintances assessed their own chances of being alive, healthy, financially secure, and happily married at various ages. Their estimates were used to construct a “future lifespan assessment” scale, which was found to be negatively correlated (-0.22) with a scale of risk-taking behavior. Respondents who perceived a long and stable future tended to report a relatively low
level of risk-taking. Although the risk-taking scale did not focus on criminal behaviors per se, it included such items as “fighting or arguing” with teachers, supervisors, or strangers.

Agnew (2002) observed a relationship between “anticipated victimization” and delinquency in a sample of male high school students. The measure of anticipated victimization was based on responses to three survey items that indexed the perceived chances of being stabbed with a knife, shot with a gun, and dying before the age of 25. This measure exhibited a significant positive effect on delinquency (property crimes and violence) in multivariate analyses, controlling for family attachment, demographic factors, and other variables.

Finally, Caldwell and her colleagues (2006) observed an association between future certainty and delinquent behavior in a national sample of African American adolescents. The authors constructed a measure of “basic life certainty” based on responses to three survey items that indexed the perceived chances of contracting HIV or AIDS, living to the age of 35, and being killed by age 21. This measure was negatively associated with delinquent behavior (lying, shoplifting, fights, and selling drugs) in multivariate analyses—among both males and females—controlling for household income, neighborhood disadvantage, family structure, and other variables. In short, respondents who estimated a relatively long lifespan tended to report a lower level of delinquency.

LIMITATIONS OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Collectively, these studies point to a significant association between the anticipation of early death and youth crime. The limitations of these studies, however, preclude firm conclusions and several questions remain unanswered. First, with respect to quantitative research in this area, prior studies have controlled for a limited range of confounding factors. Individuals who anticipate an early death may be more prone than others to suffer from a variety
of other negative circumstances. Thus, we cannot assume that they are more likely to commit
crime only because of their anticipation of early death. To rule out a spurious relationship, it is
important to control for other possible determinants of offending behavior that may be correlated
with anticipated early death (e.g., family process variables, child abuse, parental criminality, and
community-level factors).

Second, all of the studies described earlier are based on cross-sectional data, and many
rely on small and geographically-limited samples. Such data often leave in doubt the causal
direction of observed relationships. Although researchers typically assume that the anticipation
of early death is a contributing factor to youth crime and violence, the reverse may also be true;
that is, participation in a dangerous, criminal lifestyle may lead to the perception that one is at
risk of a shortened lifespan. In the words of one offender we interviewed for this project:

_I used to always think something bad would happen to me. Like someone has to pay for this bad
stuff [criminal activity]. You know what man, like they say...what comes around goes around._
(Boo, age 20).

Alternatively, young people who are already committed to a criminal lifestyle may have
an interest in portraying themselves as fearless, and even as courting death. According to Katz
(1988: 233), some offenders pride themselves on their “hardman” image—having the ability to
face chaos and death “without a quiver or a qualm” (also see Åkerström, 1985; Topalli, 2005a).
Although it would be unreasonable to expect studies in this area to completely resolve the issue
of causal order, longitudinal data would be useful and could provide the basis for drawing
reasonable causal inferences (see Sampson and Laub, 1993: 39).

Third, we currently have little knowledge of how offenders process expectations
regarding their future survival, or how such expectations affect their attitudes towards
themselves, others, and offending behavior. Although prior qualitative studies on criminal
decision-making shed some light in this area (e.g., Anderson, 1994, 1999; Hoffman, 2004;
Topalli and Wright, 2004), these studies were not specifically designed to assess offenders’ perceptions and expectations regarding the prospect of early death. In short, the psychological underpinnings of these processes and how they encourage participation in crime is not well understood.

In this paper, we address these issues by conducting two complementary analyses (see Figure 1). In Study 1, we analyze longitudinal data from a nationally representative survey of adolescents within an econometric framework. The aim of this study is to assess the relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime while controlling for a wide range of observable variables (e.g., numerous indicators of socioeconomic status, past history of abuse, parental criminality) as well as unobservable factors (unobserved heterogeneity) operating at the levels of the family, county, and state. In addition to controlling for an unusually rich set of characteristics that are likely to be correlated with both criminal behavior and anticipation of early death, we also utilize data from a large sample of twins and siblings to further eliminate the potential confounders (e.g., the effects of unobserved variables). The advantage of this quantitative strategy is that it allows us to delineate, with greater confidence, the statistical relationship between youths’ anticipation of early death and their involvement in crime.

However, such an analysis does not allow us to explore the meanings that offenders attach to the prospect of early death and the impact of such meanings and perceptions on their decisions to offend. To complete our understanding of how anticipated early death leads to increased offending, it is necessary to access information that offenders themselves have (see Feeney, 1986).

Therefore, in Study 2, we draw on interview data obtained from a sample of active street offenders. We engaged each study participant in an in-depth discussion specifically designed to
tap their perceptions regarding the risk of early death. This second study complements our quantitative analyses by exposing the causal mechanisms (e.g., discounting of future consequences, “here and now” orientation) that may link anticipated early death with criminal involvement—mechanisms that, in previous quantitative studies, have typically been inferred. Because qualitative methods can help to expose such mechanisms, their use in the final stages of large-N studies is recommended (Ragin, Nagel, and White, 2004). In addition, qualitative methods “can be helpful in assessing the credibility” of causal mechanisms posited by theorists (Ragin et al., 2004: 15).

STUDY 1: SURVEY DATA ANALYSES

DATA

The data for study 1 were drawn from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, also known as Add Health. Add Health was specifically designed to investigate adolescents' health and risk behaviors¹ and is considered the largest and most comprehensive survey of adolescents ever undertaken.² A total of 20,745 adolescents between grades 7 and 12 and their parents were interviewed in Wave I between April and December 1995 and 15,197 of them were interviewed again for Wave II conducted from April 1996 through August 1996.³

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¹ The Add Health is a program project designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris, and funded by a grant P01-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 17 other agencies. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Persons interested in obtaining data files from Add Health should contact Add Health, Carolina Population Center, 123 W. Franklin Street, Chapel Hill, NC 27516-2524 (addhealth@unc.edu).

² More information on the design of Add Health can be found at [http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design](http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design)

³ There is a third wave that was administered between August 2001 and April 2002 when the respondents were between ages 18 and 26. The sample for the Wave II In-home Interview was composed of the respondents of the Wave I In-home Interview, with the following exceptions: A respondent who was in the 12th grade in Wave I and who was not part of the genetic sample was not interviewed in Wave II. Respondents who were only in Wave I’s disabled sample were not re-interviewed.
The survey includes a number of detailed questions about the delinquent behavior of adolescents. Specifically, respondents were asked in both waves whether they had committed any of the following acts in the 12 months prior to the interview date: theft, damaging property, burglary, assault, robbery, pulling a gun or knife on someone else, and shooting or stabbing someone else. We created binary variables to indicate whether respondents engaged in each of these behaviors during the previous 12 months.

Questions were also posed to individuals regarding expectations about their lifespan. Specifically, they were asked about the chances they will (1) “live to age 35,” and (2) “will be killed by age 21.” Possible responses to each survey item include “almost no chance”, “some chance, but probably not”, “a 50-50 chance”, “a good chance”, and “almost certain”. For each item, we created three binary indicators to represent the following response categories: (1) less than a 50 percent chance, (2) a 50 percent chance, and (3) more than a 50 percent chance.

The richness of the Add Health allows us to control for an unusually extensive list of characteristics representing the socio-economic backgrounds of respondents. Specifically, we include in our models multiple binary indicators representing age, gender, various categories of race, Hispanic ethnicity, multiple categories for mother’s and father’s education, presence of mother and father in the household, an indicator for whether the respondent is the first child, various indicators for birth weight, an indicator for church attendance, various indicators for religion, binary indicators for standard test scores being in various quartiles, family income, welfare status of parents, an indicator for whether the father is the biological or step father,

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4 Survey administrators took several steps to maintain data security and to minimize the potential for interviewer or parental influence. First, respondents were not provided with any printed questionnaires. Rather, all data were recorded on laptop computers. Second, for sensitive topics, such as delinquent behavior, substance use/abuse, and gun availability, the adolescents listened to pre-recorded questions through earphones and entered their answers directly on the laptops. Rates of criminal behaviors reported in the Add Health are consistent with those measured in other sources (Mocan and Tekin, 2005, 2006).
whether the respondent was born in the U.S., whether the father was ever jailed, whether the respondent spent time in foster care, whether the respondent was a victim of abuse by parents or other caregivers, and weekly allowance of the respondent. These amount to a total of 59 control variables. When possible, we also include state, county, and time indicators in our models.

The definitions and the descriptive statistics\(^5\) of the outcome variables are presented in table 1. Table 1 also displays the descriptive statistics by perceived probability of being killed by 21 and living up to age 35. We have a total of 34,780 observations from Waves 1 and 2 combined. About 60 percent of the observations come from Wave 1 and the rest comes from Wave 2. Of the 34,780 observations, 1,308 indicated that they had less than a 50 percent chance of living up to age 35, 14,977 indicated that they have about a 50-50 chance of living up to age 35, and 18,485 indicated that they have a more than 50 percent chance of living up to age 35. A total of 29,221, 4,948, and 611 observations indicated that they had a less than 50 percent, about 50-50, and more than 50 percent chance of being killed by age 21, respectively. As illustrated in table 1, individuals who have a less confident view of their chances of living beyond ages 21 and 35 are more likely to engage in all of our measures of offending behavior.

ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK

As explained above, our “lifespan estimate” measures are based on the individual’s own perception of his/her likelihood of dying before age 21 and his/her likelihood of living at least until age 35. We believe these variables constitute good proxies for a person’s anticipation of early death and they are also consistent with the measures used in previous research. Our goal is to estimate the effects of anticipated early death on offending behaviors among adolescents. The

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\(^5\) In the interest of space, we do not discuss the descriptive statistics in detail, but they are available from the authors upon request. However, they are mostly consistent with one’s expectations as well as the relevant literature.
empirical relationship between offending behavior and anticipated early death can be specified in the following form:

\[ Y_{ist} = X_{ist} \beta + \alpha \text{AED}_{ist} + \lambda_i + \kappa_s + t_t + \epsilon_{ist}, \]  

(1)

where \( Y_{ist} \) is one of the offending behavior outcomes of individual \( i \) living in state (or county) \( s \) in year \( t \); \( X \) is a vector of individual and family level determinants of risky behaviors; AED is one of the anticipated early death (or perceived lifespan) measures; \( \lambda_i \) is a vector of binary respondent indicators; \( \kappa_s \) is a vector of state (or county) indicators; \( t_t \) is a time indicator; and \( \epsilon_{ist} \) is an idiosyncratic disturbance term. The coefficient of interest in (1) is \( \alpha \).

In equation (1) it is important to account for all of the unobserved determinants of offending behavior (or unobserved heterogeneity) that may be correlated with anticipated early death. Otherwise, the error term in equation (1) will be correlated with AED and this will result in biased estimates. Although we exploit the richness of our data set by including a long list of controls in \( X \), it can still be argued that this strategy is not sufficient to control for all the omitted variables that are correlated with both AED and \( Y \). For example, offending behavior may also be a function of local deterrence (e.g., number of police officers, the harshness of penalties) or economic conditions (e.g., the unemployment rate). These local characteristics and conditions can impact offending behavior while also being correlated with anticipated early death.

Add Health is accompanied by a rich contextual data base with county and state level variables that, in principle, could be included in our models. Instead we adopt a more effective strategy and estimate our models with state and county identifiers. This strategy, also called state (or county) fixed effects, gauges all state (or county) level conditions or attitudes towards offending behaviors that may also be correlated with anticipated early death. This allows us to avoid the risk of leaving out any relevant local variables. With state and county fixed effects, the
identification of the effect of our AED variable comes from the variation in this variable across individuals living within the same state or county, respectively. Because county or state fixed effects also capture the impacts of any local policy or attitude variables at the county or state levels, these variables cannot be included in our models separately. However, this is not a concern because the effects of those variables are not the focus of the current research. In addition to estimating models with state or county fixed effects, we also exploit the longitudinal nature of our data. Because we have information for the same individuals for two consecutive years, we are able to control for all the time-invariant unobservables of individuals. This is implemented by including individual indicators (or individual fixed effects) into equation (1).  

As another attempt to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity that would bias the $\alpha$, we will also utilize the genetic sub-sample in Add Health. Twins and siblings are over-represented in Add Health, allowing us to control for unobservables and observables common to both siblings, such as socio-economic status and parental characteristics that would be correlated with both AED and criminal propensities. This is implemented by including family identifiers (or family fixed effects), which is equivalent to estimating an equation of the following form:

$$Y_{ist} = X_{ist} \beta + \alpha AED_{ist} + FAMID_i + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (2)$$

In equation (2), the number of variables in vector $X$ is much smaller, because most of them do not vary between siblings (e.g. parents’ education, family income, welfare status, etc.). $FAMID$ is a vector of binary indicators representing the family of each respondent.

A final concern is the potential reverse causality between offending behavior and the anticipation of early death. As described earlier, participation in criminal or delinquent behavior may affect the perceptions that individuals develop about, among other things, the risk of dying.

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6 Since individual fixed effects gauge for all the time-invariant characteristics of individuals, all time-invariant observables in vector $X$ drops out of model, such as race, gender, childhood maltreatment, etc.
In order to mitigate concerns of bias stemming from this possibility, we also estimate our models using offending behaviors from Wave 2 and anticipation of early death measures from Wave 1. Anticipation of early death in Wave 1 can influence offending behaviors in Wave 2, but the reverse is not possible. Note that individual fixed effects cannot be included in these models because each individual appears only once in the analysis.

Because our outcomes are binary, we estimate linear probability models using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).\(^7\) The coefficients of a linear probability model can be interpreted as marginal effects and are extensively used by economists and other social scientists (Blau and Tekin, 2007; Chou, Rashad, and Grossman, 2005; Mocan and Tekin, 2006; Tekin and Markowitz, 2008). It is well known that OLS estimates of coefficients in linear probability models are consistent estimates of average probability derivatives, but standard error estimates are biased as a result of heteroskedasticity (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). Therefore, we report standard error estimates that are corrected for any form of heteroskedasticity.

RESULTS OF STUDY 1

We begin by presenting the results from the estimations using data from Wave 1 only. Because the results from the models with state fixed effects are almost identical to those with the county fixed effects, we only present those with the county fixed effects. In each table, we present the results from the models of the probability of being killed by age 21 in the upper panel and the results from the models of the probability of living up to age 35 in the lower panel. As illustrated in table 2, respondents who perceive a less than 50 percent chance of being killed by age 21 are less likely to commit any of the offending behaviors analyzed compared to those who perceive a 50-50 chance of being killed by age 21. Furthermore, respondents who estimate their

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\(^7\) Probit and logit models produced very similar marginal effects.
chance of being killed by age 21 at greater than 50 percent are more likely to commit any of these offenses compared to those who estimate a 50-50 chance.

Similarly, respondents who perceive a less than 50 percent chance of living to age 35 are more likely to commit any of the eight offending behaviors compared to those who perceive a 50-50 chance of living to age 35; and respondents who estimate the probability of living to age 35 at greater than 50 percent are less likely to commit these actions compared to those who estimate a 50-50 chance. Furthermore, with the exception of two coefficients (involving assault, property damage, and a greater than 50% chance of being killed by 21), all of the 32 coefficients are estimated with statistical significance at less than one percent level.

Table 3 is similar to table 2, but we use data from both Wave 1 and Wave 2 to increase the power of our estimates through a larger sample size. As displayed in table 3, with the increased sample, all of the 32 coefficients are now statistically significant at conventional levels. The coefficient estimates are also mostly consistent with those in table 2. Perceiving a less than 50 percent chance of being killed by age 21 is associated with a decrease in an adolescent’s probability of offending behavior by 2.3 percentage points (burglary) to 5.2 percentage points (damaging property). When the perceived chance of being killed by age 21 is greater than 50 percent, the probability of offending behavior increases by 3.3 percent (property damage) to 7.3 percent (pulling a knife or gun). Similarly, when the perceived chance of living to age 35 is less than 50 percent, the probability of offending behavior increases by 3.4 percentage points (graffiti) to 5.7 percentage points (assault and pulling a knife or gun); when the perceived chance of living to age 35 is greater than 50 percent, the probability of offending behavior is reduced by 4.8 percentage points (property damage) to 1.6 percentage points (shooting or stabbing).
To guard against reverse causality (i.e., bias due to the potential reverse effect of criminal involvement on anticipation of early death), we estimate models using lagged measures of the lifespan estimates. That is, we regress the offense measures from Wave 2 on our control variables and lifespan-estimate measures from Wave 1. These results are presented in table 4. We again find substantial evidence of an effect of anticipated early death on the probability of committing various offenses. The number of statistically significant coefficients decreased as a result of the reduced sample size. However, twenty of the thirty two coefficients are still estimated with precision at conventional levels. Furthermore, every single coefficient in table 4 is in the expected direction. We also conclude that reverse causality is unlikely to be an important factor causing bias in our estimates because the magnitude of our estimates are consistent with those in table 3, especially for those coefficients that are significant.

In table 5, we present our results from the sibling fixed effects. Note that this sample uses the sibling (and twins) sub-sample to control for all the observable and unobservable factors that are common between siblings such as socio-economic status. Despite the extensive controls of these factors, and a substantial reduction in the sample size, we find considerable evidence for an effect of anticipated early death on offending. With the exception of four coefficients (involving burglary, “shot or stabbed,” and a greater than 50% chance of being killed by 21; and burglary, assault, and a less than 50% chance of living to age 35), all coefficients have the expected positive and negative signs and, when statistically significant, the effects are in the expected direction.

Finally, we control for individual fixed effects exploiting the fact that each adolescent is observed twice in Add Health in Waves 1 and 2. This is a method similar to sibling fixed effects in terms of controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity that would bias our estimates. Again,
despite the extensive controls in individual fixed effects, we find considerable evidence to support the presence of an effect of anticipated early death on adolescent offending (see table 6). With the exception of two coefficients (those involving graffiti, theft, and a less than 50% chance of being killed by 21), all coefficients have the expected positive and negative signs and 15 of them are statistically significant, all in the expected direction.

The fewer numbers of statistically significant coefficients in sibling and individual fixed-effects models are not of great concern. This is because the identification in sibling and individual fixed-effects models comes from discordant records in the lifespan-estimate indicators between siblings and between Waves 1 and 2, respectively. To the extent that a majority of siblings in a family and the same adolescents between Waves 1 and 2 responded identically to these questions, the reduction in the precision of estimates is expected. To further support this notion, we see that most of the insignificant coefficients involve “the probability of being killed by 21 > 50 percent” or “the probability of living up to age 35 < 50 percent” dummies. In table 1, we see that they constitute only 3.8 percent (1,308 adolescents) and 1.8 percent (611) of the total sample, and this is in the sample with observations from Waves 1 and 2 combined. Smaller representations of these groups in the sample imply the discordant reports between siblings in a family and adolescents between Waves 1 and 2 will also be fewer. This fact would be expected to lower the statistical significance of their coefficients.

STUDY 1 SUMMARY

In sum, our quantitative analyses have helped to further isolate the effect of anticipated early death on offending behavior. In general, this effect remains significant even after controlling for a wide range of observable and unobservable determinants of offending. Moreover, we have taken initial steps to rule out the possibility of bias due to reverse causality.
Overall, our analyses and findings help to advance prior quantitative research in this area and increase confidence in the observed relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime.

To gain a better understanding of how offenders process the risk of early death and how, exactly, it affects their decision-making, we now turn to our qualitative analysis.

**STUDY 2: INTERVIEWS WITH ACTIVE STREET OFFENDERS**

**SETTING**

As part of an ongoing ethnographic study of offender decision-making funded by the National Science Foundation, in-depth interviews were conducted with active offenders recruited from the streets of Atlanta, Georgia. Atlanta is known for being a “primary distribution center” for illicit drugs within the state of Georgia, which serves as “both a final destination point for drug shipments and a smuggling corridor for drugs transported along the East Coast” (Drug Enforcement Agency, 2008, n.p.). Moreover, the city of Atlanta suffers a homicide rate that is nearly four times the national average (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006).

Recruiters concentrated their efforts in an area of the city known as Central West Atlanta (CWA), a community that, historically, has suffered high rates of drug trafficking, serious street crime, and youth violence. Although CWA has a core group of residents invested in the safety and improvement of their neighborhoods, most areas within its bounds are dominated by violence, decay, and a lack of city services, and do not represent “neighborhood communities” in the conventional middle-class sense (see Inciardi, Horowitz, and Pottieger, 1993). According to the Atlanta Police Department’s Crime Analysis Unit, CWA represented only 11 percent (47,016) of the city’s population in 2004-2005, yet accounted for 27 percent of all city homicides.
and 25 percent of the rapes, 19 percent of the robberies, and 31 percent of the aggravated assaults known to police. CWA is typical of the kinds of environments that researchers have accessed to explore and understand demographic and contextual backgrounds for studies on burglary (Cromwell and Olson, 2004; Cromwell, Olson and Avary, 1991; Piquero and Rengert, 1999; Wright and Decker, 1994), robbery and theft (Miller, 1998; Shover and Henderson, 1995; Wright and Decker, 1997), prostitution (e.g., Maher, 1997; Phoenix, 2000), carjacking (Jacobs et al., 2003; Topalli and Wright, 2004), drug dealing and drug robbery (Bourgois, 1995; Geter, 1994; Hagedorn, 1994; Jacobs, 1999, 2000, 2006; Jacobs et al., 2000; Topalli et al., 2002), crime among homeless youth (e.g., Inciardi, et al., 1993; Tyler and Johnson, 2004), gangs (e.g., Miller, 2001) and street snitching (Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright, 2003).

PARTICIPANTS AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS

We employed two different offender-recruiters to identify and locate participants for the study who fell within our stated inclusion criteria (young offenders who were actively involved in serious street crime within the past year8). These individuals were African American and focused their recruitment efforts on areas of CWA with which they were well acquainted. CWA is overwhelmingly African American (up to 96% in some neighborhoods) and because recruiters engaged with other offenders within their own network of acquaintances, they were unable to establish any relationships with non-African-American (i.e., White, Latino, or Asian) offenders. As a result, the sample almost certainly over-represents African Americans and is therefore less than a true representation of the overall population of street offenders (in Atlanta or other similar cities). However, it is important to note that although currently race is correlated with involvement in crime and violence (i.e., a risk marker), a number of studies have amply

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8 It is important to note that the offenders were recruited based on their past behavior, and not because they were identified by our recruiters as individuals who anticipated an early death. In fact, our recruiters were blind to this hypothesis in our research.
determined that it is almost certainly not the cause (i.e., a risk factor) of such behaviors (see, for example, Almgren et al., 1998; Cook and Laub, 1998; Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub, 1991; Satcher, 2001). It is therefore logical to assume that the ecological context within which these offenders operate would produce similar patterns of behavior among members of other races.

Moreover, this sample of offenders is especially well-suited for an in-depth study of anticipated early death and its impact on criminal decision-making. As Bell and Jenkins (1993: 53) observe, questions about future orientation are particularly relevant for young, inner-city black males “who may already feel alienated from a society that is not making a place for them.” Furthermore, West (1993: 12-15) observes that a key challenge facing such men is the “eclipse of hope” for the future, born out of a life of hardship, that tends to breed a “coldhearted, mean-spirited outlook” and “incredible disregard” for human life and property.

The offender interviewees were paid $50 for their participation in the study (with recruiters receiving a $50 referral fee per successful interview). All participants remained anonymous; we never asked for their real names and assured them that the interviews were to be used solely for the purpose of research. The in-depth interviews lasted from 45 to 120 minutes and were conducted between 2006 and 2008 in a private office on a university campus located in downtown Atlanta or in the streets of CWA (i.e., at fast food restaurants, public parks, or other outdoor public areas) where the interviewees and the researchers felt comfortable. The interviews followed a predetermined Q&A protocol but were semi-structured and conducted in an informal manner. This approach allowed participants to respond freely and to introduce their own concepts and categories, providing us with a more comprehensive and rich set of data to explore. This approach has been used successfully in many previous ethnographic studies of active offenders (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Topalli, 2005a; Topalli and
Wright, 2004; Wright and Decker, 1994, 1997). Interviews focused on the participants’ perceptions of risk—with particular emphasis on the risk of future injury or early death—and the extent to which these perceptions influenced their attitudes and behaviors related to offending.

ISSUES OF INTERNAL VALIDITY

Before discussing the qualitative findings, it is important to comment on the internal validity of the interviews and the possibility of distortion that might arise from interviewees’ attempts to impress us, deceive us, or to justify their conduct. The possibility of distortion is not unique to our study, but is an issue that concerns all ethnographic research based on offender interviews. To guard against deliberate dishonesty, we carefully monitored all interviews, checking for and questioning inconsistent responses. While this strategy does not eliminate the possibility of distortion, we take confidence in the results of prior research showing that active street offenders are no more likely than anyone else to lie about their circumstances (see Jacobs et al., 2000; Wright and Decker, 1994). It should be noted that the same potential for dishonesty exists within any format of research where participants are asked to discuss difficult or personal topics. Previous research on the quality and veracity of offender self-report data supports the contention that semi-structured interviews represent the most efficacious method of obtaining valid, relevant information about offending and the psychological processes that govern such behavior (see Huzinga and Elliott, 1986; West and Farrington, 1977; Wright and Bennett, 1990). Beyond that, the internal validity of these kinds of data and procedures has been exhaustively addressed in previous research and need not be fully restated here (see, for example, Jacobs et al. 2000, 2003; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Maher, 1997; Topalli et al., 2002; Topalli and Wright, 2004; Wright and Decker, 1997).
RESULTS OF STUDY 2

Our initial interviews with young offenders in Atlanta confirmed research detailed above on the fatalism and sense of “futurelessness” experienced by many inner-city youth (esp. Anderson, 1994, 1999; Durant et al., 1994; Hoffman, 2004). What soon emerged from our discussions with these young offenders was the conclusion that such fatalism emanated from their day to day experiences with and witnessing of violence:

*I grew up with shootin’ and fightin’ all over. You grew up with books and shit. Where I’m from you never know if you gonna live one minute to the next. It’s like a war out there. People die every day. You can go to sleep and hear gunshots all night man, all night. Bullets be lying on the street in the morning. Ambulances and police cars steady riding through my neighborhood, man.*

(Deathrow, age 19)

These observations on inner-city life echo previous studies of urban violence which have depicted such communities as “war zones,” where much of the violence that occurs is public (taking place on the street or in alleys and parks), and where even young children witness aggravated assaults and murders (e.g., Bell and Jenkins, 1993; Garbarino et al., 1992; Hoffman, 2004; Lorion and Saltzman, 1993). For example, based on a large sample of young people drawn from Chicago’s inner-city schools, Bell and Jenkins (1993) determined that three out of four had witnessed a robbery or some other type of serious violent crime. Thirty-five percent of these children had been witness to a stabbing, 39 percent had witnessed a shooting, and 24 percent “reported that they had seen someone killed” (Bell and Jenkins, 1993: 49).

Many of the violent attacks witnessed by inner-city children involve victims that they know personally, including classmates, friends, neighbors, and family members. Furthermore, nearly half (47%) of the inner-city students in the Bell and Jenkins (1993: 48-49) study had been personally victimized; either robbed (16%), threatened with a knife (23%) or gun (17%), shot at (11%), stabbed (4%), or attacked in some other way. Singer and his colleagues (1995) observed particularly high rates of violent victimization among male public high school students drawn...
from central-city areas of Denver and Cleveland, with 28 percent of the Denver students and 33 percent of the Cleveland students reporting that they had been shot or shot at.

These experiences with violence contribute to a pervasive sense of fear and vulnerability in such communities (Lorion and Saltzman, 1993) and are indicative of the kind of victimization that offenders themselves experience. For example, Topalli (2005b) conducted a study comparing social perceptions of active offenders, demographic controls (i.e., individuals from the same neighborhoods as the offenders who did not engage in crime) and college controls from St. Louis. College controls (who lived primarily in safer suburban areas of St. Louis) experienced a violent victimization rate of 14.2%, while rates were much higher for demographic controls (50%) and offenders (68.8%) who lived in the most dangerous, crime-ridden areas of North St. Louis. Moreover, previous research has demonstrated a strong relationship between prior exposure to violence and later perpetration of aggression among youth living in poor urban environments (Eitle and Turner, 2002; Farrell, 1997; see also Margolin and Gordis, 2000; Scarpa, 2003, 2001).

Predictably, our interviewees described their own lives and neighborhoods as plagued by the persistent threat of violence. In fact, many claimed to have been shot or stabbed in the past—some multiple times—and could point to scars that, at the very least, provided evidence of severe physical trauma. Moreover, they could recall early memories of violence and described an acute awareness of their own vulnerability:

*I’ve been robbed when I was at school, been ripped off, been shot at. No joke. They shot at my cousins. They shot at my brother. Hell, someone shot at my granny’s house. It’s f***ed up, for real. Cuz, you don’t know...you just walkin’ around, might not even be doin’ no shit, and someone just pull up and try to knock you. [Referring to a recent news event] You hear in the news about that little 3 year old kid got shot? He ain’t in the game [in the drug dealing business] but he got shot anyhow, right?* (Foosey, age 18).

In some interviews, offenders informed us that such bleak outlooks were reinforced by family members and friends, either as a way of informally indoctrinating them into the violent
culture they were a part of or as an attempt to scare them into abandoning their lifestyles (also see Hoffman, 2004). Ironically, attempts to scare these young men from crime by highlighting their prospects for an early death may have backfired. When asked about how he had thought about his future Cris Cris responded,

*I swore that I wasn’t gonna see 19. I swear. The way I was goin, I didn’t think I was ever gonna see 19. I swear. My aunties used to always say, “man you gonna be dead.” My aunties, my whole family. My momma and my grand-momma never told me nothin like that. My aunties would say that. The way I was goin’, I was goin’ a real rough route. Made me wanna go do some more stuff. Made me wanna go do some more bad stuff.*

We are reminded of the poignant questions raised by Bell and Jenkins (1993: 53), who helped to document the violent milieu in which many inner-city young people are immersed:

> How does this very real threat [of community violence], often underscored by frequent attendance at peers’ funerals, affect adolescent males’ sense of a future? How does a sense of future impact on willingness to engage in risk-taking behaviors, including violence? How is a willingness to form close relationships with others affected when you are not sure about your own future or that of the other person?... When does a sense of futurelessness turn into nihilism?

As the interviews progressed, our study participants helped to shed additional light on these very issues. Although acutely aware of the risks of violent injury or death, our participants did not dwell overtly on such possibilities. Rather, as all consistently stressed, and as theorized by Elizabeth Hill and her colleagues (1997), the possibility of a shortened life span encouraged them to focus on the “here and now.” When asked if they worried about being victimized, Baby Boy and J.R. responded;

*Everyday there’s a chance I will get robbed, stabbed, or killed. You know what I’m saying? You put your life on the line every day, every motherf***in’ day. I just take it a day at a time.* (Baby Boy, 21)

*I just take it day by day... I try not to think about danger until it comes by me. If it comes by me, then I think about it. But really, what is the point? Ain’t nothing you can do about it, so just need to deal with right now, you know. Right now more important than later tomorrow man.* (J.R., age 20).

Our participants’ narrow focus on day-to-day events and avoidance of long-term considerations was impressed upon us further when we specifically asked them to assess the
probability of living beyond the next five years. Using the survey items from study 1 as a guide, we asked the following questions: “What do you think the chances are that you will be killed in the next five years? Would you say greater than a 50 percent chance? About 50/50? Or less than a 50 percent chance?” Almost invariably, our participants struggled to answer this question, not because they failed to understand it, but because—as they explained—they simply do not think about the future:

*I can’t answer that question. I don’t think about it [the chances of getting killed in the future].* (Baby Boy, age 21).

*Shit, who knows? I don’t trip off that. That is not something I think on. It is what it is. Life is short. I don’t know what the chance is. Might be dead by 25 so who cares?* (Magic Blue, age 22)

To extent that our interviewees could address such questions, they depicted life as inherently unpredictable, where even *day-to-day* survival amounted to a “crap shoot”—a fact that they accepted, but one that also underscored the futility of future planning:

*I say f*** tomorrow. It’s all about today. Might not be a tomorrow. Might get shot. Might get hit by a bus. So get it now. Now, now, now. Next week might as well be next century. F*** next week. F*** tomorrow.* (Blue Eyes, age 23)

*It’s a waste to think about the future. What if someone pops me while I’m slingin’ [dealing drugs]. Then what? I got shit to do man. I can’t think about that stuff.* (Ookie, age 19)

To a large degree, the attitudes of our study participants resemble the coping responses that develop among individuals in war torn countries. In an article titled, “When Death Seems Inevitable,” war correspondent Robert Cox (2006: 8) describes how he managed to function while facing the daily threat of violent death:

*Courage, I discovered while covering the “dirty war” in Argentina, is a relatively simple mater of overcoming fear. I realized one day that I could deal with the idea that I would be killed, simply by accepting it as fact. The knot in my stomach loosened considerably after that. There was no reason to fear being killed once that reality had been accepted. It is fear itself that makes one afraid… Some Iraqi reporters explain that their ability to function is because they accept their inevitable date with death.*
As described by some of our active offenders, courage in the face of danger was, in fact, a requirement of their criminal involvement, including drug dealing, robbery, and carjacking (also see Jacobs et al, 2000; McCarthy and Hagan, 2005). In the words of one participant, “You got to be prepared or you gonna get taken” (Foosey, age 18). Thus, the acceptance of death or its possibility may facilitate crime because it helps to neutralize the fear that would otherwise be associated with dangerous criminal pursuits.

But the responses of our interviewees suggest several additional ways in which the anticipation of early death may be linked to youth crime. First, as described above, the perceived risk of an early death appears to contribute to a “here and now” orientation, a disregard for the future consequences of one’s actions, and a focus on immediate rewards and benefits; that is, “get it now.” As Tittle, Ward, and Grasmick argue (2004), self-control requires both the capacity for self-control as well as the desire to exercise restraint. When young people lose faith in their future, we would expect them to lose the incentive to defer immediate gratification (also see Hill et al., 1997).

Second, the prospect of an early death, along with extensive exposure to community violence, may contribute to attitudes that justify crime and violence, including desensitization to the consequences of violence, a hostile world view, and disregard for human life (Garbarino et al., 1992; Kotlowitz, 1991; Lorion and Saltzman, 1993: Topalli, 2005a; West, 1993). As some of our participants described:

*My way of lookin’ at this is, God gonna take everybody, OK? Gonna take me. Gonna take you. So, what the f*** am I gonna care for anybody? I’m not. I’m gonna get mine, and if I have to kill your ass to do it, so what? You’d kill me wouldn’t you? Wouldn’t you? So, what’s the point? Might as well win. Somebody gotta win, somebody gotta lose. Gotta win until you lose. When you lose you dead. It’s like that.* (Chazz, age 17)

*There’s only a short time in the world for everybody. I’m gonna make yours shorter than mine. Believe that. I don’t think about nobody but me and mines, you hear? No sympathy, no way.* (Pac, age 19)
In short, these young men appear to embody the nihilism described by West (1993; also see Anderson, 1999; Kitwana, 2002; Kubrin, 2006). For them, death is an omnipresent reality, and they adapt to this reality by embracing the attitudes of the macho. The macho feels a need to not be afraid, to always be ready to die, and “to never give in” (Younoszai, 1993: 74). The macho is also angry and violent, and “violence that is not afraid of death is violence that can kill” (Younoszai, 1993: 74). When we commented to Cris Cris that he seemed fearless, he explained:

Cris Cris: I always been like that though since I was young. Ain’t never had no father or brothers to protect me or tell me what’s up, really I just had to stand my own ground, ain’t have nobody to tell me, “man, you don’t needa be doin this.” My mom would tell me that but I wouldn’t listen to her. She don’t know shit. She’s a woman. She ain’t livin’ my life. I feel like I’m the smart one because I know that life is short. Life is short, so its smart to get yours now. Only the strong survive man. I’m a man, you hear. I live this shit.

INTERVIEWER: Is that why you think you are so fearless?

Cris Cris: That was sorta the reason, cuz ain’t wasn’t no guarantee I’s gonna see tomorrow. That’s another reason, see. They’s a lot of folks who want me dead. I’m living a real tough life. I had everybody lookin’ out for themselves. So, I have to do that too, you know. Ain’t no point in being scared because you cannot know [what] you gonna die from. So, I can just, you know, not think about danger and shit. If I see something I want I take it right then because that might be your only chance in this world to get some. Somebody might be shootin’ dice on the curb or something, I walk up and take all the money. So like that.

STUDY 2 SUMMARY

We are struck by the apparent overlap between existing, analytical models of risk-taking—especially those incorporating an emphasis on lifespan estimates (Hill et al, 1997; Ross and Hill, 2002)—and the accounts provided by our active offenders. Both suggest that anticipated early death is linked to crime, in part, because uncertainty over future survival promotes a focus on immediate gratification and a disregard for future consequences. In addition, our offender accounts suggest that the anticipation of early death may contribute to (or facilitate) criminal involvement by engendering nihilistic attitudes and by neutralizing fear (required to pursue dangerous criminal activity). The convergence of such processes results in young offenders experiencing little incentive to abide by the law or refrain from violence. These
additional concepts, revealed through the use of our interview-based methodology, help to further illuminate the nature of the relationship between anticipated early death and criminality and are featured in the (elaborated) explanatory model (see figure 2).

CONCLUSION

Researchers from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds have pointed to the anticipation of early death, or a sense of “futurelessness,” as a possible contributing factor to youth crime and violence (e.g., Anderson, 1994, 1999; Lorion and Saltzman, 1993; Wilson and Daly, 1997). Some researchers have incorporated this form of fatalism into analytical models of risk-taking (Hill et al., 1997; Ross and Hill, 2002), while others have taken initial steps to assess its empirical relationship to youth crime (Caldwell et al., 2006; DuRant et al., 1994). Our goals in this paper were to: (1) verify the statistical relationship that has been observed in prior studies, using relatively rigorous statistical procedures, and (2) deepen our understanding of this relationship, and of the possible causal mechanisms involved, with the aid of in-depth interviews with criminal offenders. The ultimate aim of this multi-methods approach was to help move us beyond basic questions (e.g., “Is there a non-spurious, statistical relationship between anticipated early death and youth crime?”) and to facilitate the exploration of more complicated and nuanced social processes.

Toward this end, the results of our examination suggest several promising avenues for future research. First, future quantitative studies could follow-up on the insights we extracted from our interviews with active offenders. The accounts provided by these offenders point to several mediating variables that could be explored in future research, including a present-time orientation, perceived salience of immediate benefits, a disregard for the future consequences of
behavior, a low desire to exercise self-control, fearlessness, and nihilistic attitudes that may result from the anticipation of early death. Two additional mechanisms that may link anticipated early death with crime, and that were implicit in the offender interviews, include: (1) the development of an “unpredictability schema”—a pervasive belief that the world is a chaotic place—(see Ross and Hill, 2002), and (2) lack of investment in conventional pursuits; namely, those associated with delayed benefits, such as school, legitimate work, or the development of a skill.

Second, future research efforts should address the origins of anticipated early death. Likely contributing factors include extensive exposure to community violence (Bell and Jenkins, 1993; Garbarino et al., 1992; Hoffman, 2004; Lorion and Saltzman, 1993) and residence in neighborhoods that suffer a high mortality rate (Wilson and Daly, 1997). According to Anderson (1999: 135), “…some young people bereft of hope for the future have made their peace with death…The high death rate among their peers keeps many from expecting to live beyond the age twenty-five.”

Wilson and Daly’s (1997) aggregate-level study of Chicago communities found a strong negative correlation (-0.88) between average male life expectancy and the neighborhood homicide rate, even after removing the effects of homicide mortality on life expectancy. Based on these findings, they suggest that “people behave as if they have adjusted their rates of future discounting and risk acceptance thresholds in relation to local life expectancy” (Wilson and Daly, 1997: 1273). However, the authors did not measure the perceived chances of early death, or future discounting, directly. It may also be the case that certain types of mortality, such as the violent death of a close friend or family member, may have an especially strong impact on individuals’ lifespan estimates.
An understanding of the origins of anticipated early death may ultimately suggest ways to foster young peoples’ optimism in the future and, hence, reduce criminal involvement and other risky behaviors. Existing theory and research highlights the importance of safe and stable environments for young people (Bell and Jenkins, 1993; Hill et al., 1997; Ross and Hill, 2002), but future research in this area could lead to the development of interventions designed to foster resilience and hope among those who have already faced considerable instability and unpredictability in their lives.

At the same time, future research in this area may help to illuminate some of the social dynamics that work against behavior or attitudinal change. For example, Wilson and Daly (1997) raise the possibility of an aggregate-level feedback loop operating in disadvantaged communities, in which low life expectancy contributes to future discounting and increased homicidal violence, which further lowers life expectancy. Although not specified by existing analytical models, it is not difficult to imagine a similar feedback or amplification loop operating at the level of individuals. For example, implicit in our offender interviews is the possibility that, while the anticipation of early death and a “sense of futurelessness” may promote criminal activity, criminal activity and its associated dangers may only serve to reinforce initial low expectations about the future. Although the empirical exploration of such possibilities may prove to be very challenging, they warrant attention in future theoretical and empirical research.

Finally, research on risk and future discounting highlights the potential limitations of crime-control strategies that seek only to increase the costs of youth crime. Attempts to modify the future costs of criminal behavior (e.g., an increase in criminal penalties) may have little effect on young people who discount their future (see Anderson, 1994; Hill et al., 1997). The anticipation of early death, in particular, may help to explain the fearless nature of some
offenders in the face of crime’s potential costs, including legal consequences and long-term disadvantage but also immediate physical danger.
REFERENCES


Figure 1. Conceptual and Methodological Model Linking Anticipated Early Death (AED) to Criminal Behavior

- **STUDY 1**: Quantitative Analysis
  - AED
    - Long-term consequences of behavior are discounted
    - Immediate benefits of behavior become salient
    - “Here and now” orientation
    - Attraction to risky behaviors
    - Crime, Violence

- **STUDY 2**: Qualitative Analysis
Figure 2. Elaborated Conceptual Model Linking Anticipated Early Death (AED) to Criminal Behavior.
Table 1
Definitions and Descriptive Statistics

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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Prob. live 35 &lt; 50%</th>
<th>Prob. live 35 = 50%</th>
<th>Prob. live 35 &gt; 50%</th>
<th>Prob. killed 21 &lt; 50%</th>
<th>Prob. killed 21 = 50%</th>
<th>Prob. killed 21 &gt; 50%</th>
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<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
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<td>(0.361)</td>
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<td>Robbery</td>
<td>=1 if use or threaten to use a weapon to get something from someone, =0 otherwise</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.286)</td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.278)</td>
<td>(0.321)</td>
<td>(0.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulled knife or</td>
<td>=1 if pulled a gun or knife on someone else, =0 otherwise</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.314)</td>
<td>(0.214)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
<td>(0.255)</td>
<td>(0.358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot or Stabbed</td>
<td>=1 if shot or stabbed someone else, =0</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td>34,780</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>14,977</td>
<td>18,495</td>
<td>29,221</td>
<td>4,948</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Mean scores shown, with standard deviations in parentheses. All the variables refer to the past 12 months.
Table 2
OLS Estimates of the Effects of Anticipated Early Death on Offending Behaviors - Wave I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of being killed by 21 &lt; 50%</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Graffiti</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Property Damage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Pulled Knife or Gun</th>
<th>Shot or Stabbed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.039***</td>
<td>-0.077***</td>
<td>-0.057***</td>
<td>-0.029***</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
<td>-0.046***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &lt; 50%</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.048***</td>
<td>0.081***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.059***</td>
<td>0.071***</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>-0.036***</td>
<td>-0.057***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>-0.026***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>20,088</td>
<td>20,080</td>
<td>20,068</td>
<td>20,077</td>
<td>20,087</td>
<td>20,091</td>
<td>20,102</td>
<td>20,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at <10, <5, and <1 percent levels, respectively.
### Table 3

**OLS Estimates of the Effects of Anticipated Early Death on Offending Behaviors - Wave I and Wave II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Graffiti</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Property Damage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Pulled Knife or Gun</th>
<th>Shot or Stabbed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of being killed by 21 &lt; 50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.031***</td>
<td>-0.052***</td>
<td>-0.042***</td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
<td>-0.025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.044***</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
<td>0.033*</td>
<td>0.056***</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.073***</td>
<td>0.051***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of living up to 35 &lt; 50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
<td>0.053***</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.047***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of living up to 35 &gt; 50%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.022***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>-0.048***</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
<td>-0.024***</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>County Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of observations</strong></td>
<td>34,479</td>
<td>34,460</td>
<td>34,462</td>
<td>34,461</td>
<td>34,482</td>
<td>34,483</td>
<td>34,504</td>
<td>34,497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at <10, <5, and <1 percent levels, respectively.
### Table 4
**OLS Estimates of the Effects of Anticipated Early Death on Offending Behaviors - Wave 2 Outcomes and Wave I AED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Graffiti</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Property Damage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Pulled Knife or Gun</th>
<th>Shot or Stabbed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of being killed by 21 &lt; 50%</strong></td>
<td>-0.028***</td>
<td>-0.033***</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.044***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
<td>-0.027***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</strong></td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.030*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of living up to 35 &lt; 50%</strong></td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.025*</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.022**</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Probability of living up to 35 &gt; 50%</strong></td>
<td>-0.030***</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.018***</td>
<td>-0.026***</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
<td>-0.020***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>County Fixed Effects</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of observations</strong></td>
<td>14,334</td>
<td>14,328</td>
<td>14,340</td>
<td>14,333</td>
<td>14,342</td>
<td>14,338</td>
<td>14,352</td>
<td>14,353</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at <10, <5, and <1 percent levels, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Graffiti</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Property Damage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Pulled Knife or Gun</th>
<th>Shot or Stabbed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of being killed by 21 &lt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.026**</td>
<td>-0.035**</td>
<td>-0.030**</td>
<td>-0.020*</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &lt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.069***</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.019**</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.035***</td>
<td>-0.019***</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>7,070</td>
<td>7,065</td>
<td>7,068</td>
<td>7,065</td>
<td>7,071</td>
<td>7,072</td>
<td>7,069</td>
<td>7,068</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at <10, <5, and <1 percent levels, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability of being killed by 21 &lt; 50%</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Graffiti</th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Property Damage</th>
<th>Theft</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Pulled Knife or Gun</th>
<th>Shot or Stabbed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.025**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.012**</td>
<td>-0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of being killed by 21 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.039*</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.054***</td>
<td>0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &lt; 50%</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.033**</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of living up to 35 &gt; 50%</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.017**</td>
<td>-0.009**</td>
<td>-0.014**</td>
<td>-0.008**</td>
<td>-0.006*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>34,649</td>
<td>34,628</td>
<td>34,632</td>
<td>34,628</td>
<td>34,652</td>
<td>34,652</td>
<td>34,673</td>
<td>34,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at <10, <5, and <1 percent levels, respectively.